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Ordoliberalizing the Neighbourhood? 
The EU’s Promotion of Regulatory Reforms in Egypt* 
 
 
Abstract 
While the EU has long been promoting economic reforms in neighbouring countries, scant 
attention has hitherto been paid to its regulatory efforts. This paper addresses this empirical 
gap with reference to the EU’s promotion of regulatory reforms in three economic sectors in 
Egypt: agriculture, banking and telecom. It finds that these reforms are significantly, if 
selectively, informed by ordoliberal principles and practices. Two theoretical implications of 
this finding are explored. On the one hand, while this substantiates the institutional 
isomorphism hypothesis, for which the EU tends to export its own models elsewhere, the 
selectivity with which this occurs demonstrates greater instrumentality than usually 
maintained in this literature. On the other hand, understanding ordoliberalism as a variation 
within the neoliberal template shaping restructuring in Egypt, this paper moves beyond 
binary views of regulatory cooperation and competition and thus also enriches debates on 
the EU as a global regulator. 
 
Keywords: ordoliberalism; EU-Egypt relations; ENP; regulatory externalization; 
institutional isomorphism 
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Introduction 
Since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995, and more 
systematically since the 2004 launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU 
has been promoting a range of reforms in neighbouring countries. Most scholarly literature 
has hitherto focused on the tensions and contradictions between promoting democracy and 
preserving stability in the region (Pace et al., 2009; Seeberg, 2009). The relative neglect of 
economic reforms partly depends on the alignment of EU-promoted reforms with the 
agenda of international economic organizations (IEOs), such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which in turn 
makes it hard to disaggregate the EU’s specific contribution in this field. This is 
compounded by the fact that existing literature on the political economy of Euro-
Mediterranean relations focuses on aid and trade (Martin, 2004; Holden, 2009, 2010), aspects 
on which the EU’s approach is admittedly somewhat unoriginal. This neglect is however 
surprising if one considers that ‘the EU most consequentially affects the international system 
by externalizing its internal economic and social market-related policies and regulatory 
measures’ (Damro, 2015, p. 1336). Given its focus on the EU’s promotion of regulatory 
reforms in the largest Arab country, Egypt, this paper is a first contribution to addressing 
this empirical gap concerning the EU’s regulatory externalization in neighbouring countries. 
While empirical in nature, the exploration of this gap has significant implications for 
theoretical debates on the EU’s external relations, to which this paper contributes in two 
ways. On the one hand, it provides an outward extension of existing literature on the 
influence of ordoliberalism on the EU’s economic governance model (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999; Gerber, 1998), which has arguably intensified since the Eurozone crisis 
(Nedergaard and Snaith, 2015; Ryner, 2015; Schäfer, 2016). It is argued that ordoliberal 
principles and practices are an integral part of the EU’s promotion of regulatory reforms in 
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ENP partner countries. Insofar as it differs from the view of the EU as a neoliberal actor 
suggested in recent literature (Tagma et al., 2013; İşleyen, 2015), this finding identifies a 
distinctive contribution of the EU to the process of neoliberal restructuring. On the other 
hand, this paper also brings into dialogue two bodies of literature that have hitherto 
developed in isolation, focusing respectively on EU’s regulatory externalization (Damro, 
2012; Young, 2015) and on the role of institutional isomorphism in EU’s external relations 
(Bicchi, 2006). More specifically, this piece agrees with the latter on the EU’s tendency to 
promote its own governance models elsewhere, but draws from the former to show that 
instrumentality is much more prominent in EU’s regulatory externalization than afforded by 
institutional isomorphism, as demonstrated by the selectivity with which different 
ordoliberal tenets are promoted in Egypt. Additionally, this paper moves beyond the binary 
opposition between regulatory cooperation and competition characteristic of the literature 
on the EU as a global regulator. As the ordoliberal nature of EU-promoted regulatory 
reforms is inserted within the broader context of neoliberal restructuring in Egypt, one can 
explore instances in which the EU simultaneously cooperates and competes with IEOs and 
other main reform promoters. 
In substantiating its empirical and theoretical contributions, the paper proceeds as 
follows. The first section provides an account of EU economic reform promotion in the 
context of the global economic restructuring taking place since the 1970s. This is essential to 
grasp how the EU’s ordoliberal approach to regulatory reforms is better understood as a 
differentiation within, rather than against, the neoliberal template promoted by IEOs. Once 
this point is established, the second section examines three regulatory reforms promoted by 
the EU in Egypt in the last decade of Mubarak’s rule (2000-2011), concerning respectively 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards in agriculture, the banking supervisory 
framework and the telecom regulatory framework. The third section explores the 
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implications of these findings for relevant theories of EU’s external relations beyond the 
specific case of EU-Egypt relations. 
Given its historic strategic importance, often leading the EU to give greater weight to 
security over other concerns, one would expect the EU to prioritize access to Egypt’s large 
internal market over the terms on which such market is reformed and regulated. This is 
especially true in the sectors examined, undoubtedly among the most crucial ones for the 
EU’s economic interests. Hence, if ordoliberalism influences significantly the EU’s 
regulatory reform promotion activities in Egypt, the same might plausibly happen in smaller 
and less strategically relevant neighbouring countries. In developing and corroborating its 
claims, the paper combines document analysis with interviews conducted in Egypt between 
2010 and 2015. Documents include all ENP memos and country progress reports, and 
documents produced and commissioned by EU and Egyptian institutions on the reforms 
examined. Similarly, twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials 
involved in the reforms examined, coming from the EU Delegation to Egypt, the World 
Bank and relevant Egyptian institutions, including several ministries, the Central Bank of 
Egypt (CBE) and the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA). 
Interviews focused on both process and content. The former, as well as the original content 
of regulatory reforms, has been shaped fairly unilaterally by the EU, in line with remarks on 
the limited ownership of partner countries contained in the 2015 ENP review (European 
Commission, 2015). Given its focus on the EU, this paper considers Egyptian actors only 
insofar as they affect policy implementation, and in so doing elicit (or not) a reaction from 
the EU side. 
 
 
 
An ordoliberal power? The EU in global neoliberal restructuring 
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Global economic restructuring is often presented as the ineluctable consequence of 
globalization, producing a flattening in economic space (Friedman, 2005), the declining 
relevance of borders (Ohmae, 1991), and ultimately the retreat of the state (Strange, 1996). 
While the policy constraints faced by poorer countries are real, this fatalist narrative can be 
contested on three levels. Firstly, globalization is arguably the most successful embodiment 
of ‘a process without a subject’ (Hay, 2002), and thus an easy scapegoat for policy decisions 
that no one wants to take responsibility for. For all the importance of technological 
transformations, it is well established that state agency was essential to both unleashing and 
sustaining the main drivers of globalization (Helleiner, 1994; Gritsch, 2005). Thus, to restore 
agency to a process with undoubtedly structural effects, it is more accurate to speak of 
global economic restructuring. Secondly, globalization is also an underdetermined concept 
(Rosenberg, 2005), as it tells us very little about the terms on which this restructuring occurs 
beyond a generic reference to higher levels of economic integration (Garrett, 2000). So as to 
differentiate it from previous waves of economic integration, and to identify the specific 
nature and content of the global economic restructuring occurring since the late 1970s, one 
must explicitly acknowledge the neoliberal thrust of this process (Blyth, 2003; Harvey, 2005). 
Thirdly, the integration produced has hardly been uniform both between and within 
countries, and if anything it has demonstrated further the unevenness of capitalist 
development, rather than its supposed equalizing effects. This is visible especially in the 
proliferation of core-periphery patterns not only between but also within countries, as a by-
product of the opening-up of markets brought about by neoliberal restructuring (Agnew, 
2001; Birch and Mykhnenko, 2009). On the one hand, this depends on local specificities, 
which bring about several variations in the neoliberal template (Cerny, 2004; Macartney, 
2010). On the other hand, this differentiation is also related to the specific reforms promoted 
by regional and global actors. This is where the EU’s external economic activities come in. 
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Once EU efforts at promoting economic reforms in neighbouring countries are located 
within this global context, one can more easily identify the EU’s contribution to the broader 
neoliberal restructuring occurring in countries like Egypt, while also appreciating the 
peculiarities of the EU’s approach. Two of them are especially important. Firstly, compared 
to IEOs, the EU has historically relied on an approach to economic restructuring 
characterized by gradualism (Dodini and Fantini, 2006). This had been tried and tested within 
the EC/EU, with respect to the reforms expected of member states since the Single European 
Act, and especially following the Maastricht Treaty (Ryner, 1998). By setting criteria and 
benchmarks, the EU created the conditions for a gradual harmonization of laws and 
regulations in most economic sectors (Falkner et al., 2005). A similar approach, with periodic 
monitoring and progress evaluation in different areas, and heavy reliance on policy 
conditionality, has been applied first to candidate countries and then to ENP partners, 
through both Association Agreements (AA) and Action Plans (AP) (Kelley, 2006). 
In the specific case of Egypt, however, one must not forget that the IEOs’ approach to 
economic reforms has been more gradual than in most other developing countries engaged 
in structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s (Momani, 2005). This is mostly because of 
Egypt’s strategic relevance for the West, which has historically pushed IEOs to turn a blind 
eye to limited progress on structural reforms (Amin, 1995). This does not mean, however, 
that the Egyptian economy has remained unchanged. Rather, if in a slow and disjointed 
form, through Sadat’s infitah policies, Egypt embarked on the route to neoliberal reforms 
earlier than other Arab Mediterranean countries (Ayubi, 1995; Bergh, 2012; Cavatorta & 
Haugbølle, 2012). The process experienced a step change following the 1987 fiscal crisis, 
with increased IEOs involvement following the 1991 IMF-sponsored Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP). As a result, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the 
Egyptian economy was transformed along neoliberal lines, although Washington Consensus 
principles were articulated with persisting crony relations between government and private 
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sector (Adly, 2010). The neoliberal direction taken by the Egyptian economy can be inferred 
from macroeconomic outcomes. Liberalization of current and capital account were among 
the first measures implemented (Ikram, 2006), while the dual exchange rate was eliminated 
only in the early 2000s, but was then believed to have reached the competitive rate necessary 
to boost exports (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003). Two waves of privatization had 
reduced direct state presence in the productive economy, touching in the mid-2000s 
previously off-limits sectors such as banks and oil refineries (Richter, 2006). A regressive 
general sales tax and tax breaks and lower corporate tax for businesses were also 
implemented (Soliman, 2011). While fiscal discipline was still intermittent at best, and 
subsidies still weighed on the state budget (Ikram, 2006), most other indicators suggested 
that Egypt had clearly moved in a neoliberal direction, if through a gradual and protracted 
process. 
If gradualism was common to other reform promoters, the EU’s distinctiveness in 
promoting economic restructuring in Egypt is found in its second specificity vis-à-vis IEOs 
and other main donors. This consists in the EU’s approach taking much more the form of re-
regulation rather than the deregulation advocated by the Chicago School variety of 
neoliberalism, as highlighted internally by the rise of the regulatory state in Europe (Majone, 
1994). This approach implies a much larger role played by state institutions not only in 
monitoring markets, but also to a large extent in shaping them, with the aim of creating an 
economic order based on and fostering competition. This is very much in line with the 
prescriptions of German ordoliberalism, whose influence on the EU’s economic constitution 
has been documented extensively (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999; Gerber, 1998). One of the 
key contentions of this paper is that ordoliberal principles and practices also inform the 
nature and content of the regulatory reforms promoted by the EU in Egypt. 
In contrast with the Anglo-American variety of neoliberalism, the ordoliberal tradition 
is founded on the assumption that the market order is inherently fragile, and in need of a 
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strong political authority able to foster and protect competition (Gerber, 1998). Hence, 
government is not the problem, but rather ‘the solution to the problem, as long as it is the 
right kind of government’ (Schnyder and Siems, 2013, p. 253), that is: one that shapes 
markets so that their regulation is not simply market-conforming, but rather market-shaping 
and competition-enforcing. This constitutes a crucial difference from the market-
conforming, efficiency-seeking approach to regulation of the Chicago School tradition 
(Bartalevich, 2016). Additionally, not all forms of competition are perceived to be the same, 
with ordoliberals valuing ‘achievement competition’ over ‘impediment competition’ (Blyth, 
2013, pp. 137): rather than in a race to the bottom where regulatory impediments are 
removed one after another, competitiveness is better ensured through the quality of the 
goods and services produced, and the process ensuring that quality. The potentially more 
positive role ascribed to the state can be traced back to the greater awareness that 
ordoliberalism demonstrates, vis-à-vis Anglo-American neoliberalism, ‘of the limits of the 
market mechanisms and competition and of the legitimacy of other ordering principles that 
might coexist in other areas of a society’ (Schnyder and Siems, 2013, p. 254).1 In light of this 
premise, ordoliberalism shows greater sensitivity to institutional and power dynamics, as 
witnessed by the pressing concern for moral hazard in all its guises (Nedergaard and Snaith, 
2015; Siems and Schnyder, 2014). Such sensitivity translates into a drive to simultaneously 
embed and constrain power through law, in a process of constitutionalization enforcing the 
formal separation between economics and politics (Bonefeld, 2015). Following from this, 
while there is agreement with the Anglo-American view that direct governmental 
interference in the market is to be avoided, ordoliberals accept and encourage institutional 
                                                          
1 In this regard, ‘[n]eoclassical economics was deemed sociologically ignorant regarding the 
importance of power, regulation, industrial concentration, technology and norms within twentieth-
century capitalism’ (Davies, 2014, p. 76) 
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action on market structure aimed at shaping a competitive market order (Siems and 
Schnyder, 2014). 
While ordoliberalism and neoliberalism differ markedly in assumptions and policy 
implications, one must keep in mind their foundational commonalities. After all, they share 
the same fundamental goal: the organization of the economy around competitive markets. 
From an historical perspective, the two traditions were part of a common political and 
economic project, especially influenced by Hayek’s back and forth between Europe and the 
US (Peck, 2010, pp. 55-61). Largely as a function of power relations on a global scale, despite 
its earlier origins ordoliberalism was effectively subsumed within neoliberalism, becoming 
one of its possible varieties (Schnyder and Siems, 2013; Ryner, 2015). This point is especially 
important from a methodological perspective, as it provides the possibility of accounting for 
both the general coherence of the process of neoliberal restructuring and the specificity of 
the EU’s contribution with its promotion of regulatory reforms. 
Hence, contrary to the ‘crowding out’ assumption informing much IEOs’ reform 
promotion in developing countries, the EU’s approach focuses on the creation of 
institutional capacity to be deployed towards shaping and regulating markets in a way that 
fosters achievement competition. As a result, the EU’s reform promotion activities in 
neighbouring countries are often presented in the language of ‘regulatory upgrading’, 
whereby ENP partner countries are encouraged to move towards harmonizing their 
regulatory frameworks with EU ones. Importantly, the EU’s ordoliberal approach to 
regulatory reform promotion is better understood as a differentiation within the broader 
neoliberal template, rather than an alternative to it, inasmuch as opening up markets and 
broadening the scope for competition is at the heart of both projects. In light of its 
willingness to integrate in the global economy, and increase cooperation with the EU more 
specifically, Egypt provides an ideal test case for assessing both the EU’s contribution to 
neoliberal economic restructuring and the extent of its differentiation. 
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Regulation, regulation, regulation? Evidence from EU-promoted reforms in Egypt 
This section outlines the nature and content of three regulatory reforms promoted by the EU 
in Egypt, respectively with reference to sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) in 
agriculture, banking sector supervision in compliance with Basel II standards, and telecom 
regulation. It has three main aims: to highlight the ordoliberal influence on these reforms; to 
show how they contributed to the broader restructuring along neoliberal lines, but in ways 
that underscored the EU’s distinctive approach; and to illustrate how reforms were meant to 
provide EU-based companies with a competitive advantage vis-à-vis Egyptian and foreign 
firms. 
Despite sustained engagement with IEOs throughout the 1990s, it was only in the 
following decade, when the EU’s increasing regional assertiveness was met with a change in 
political personnel within the ruling National Democratic Party, that the EU played an 
integral role in Egypt’s economic restructuring. This was reflected in the division of labour 
between the EU and IEOs, with a World Bank official suggesting that the EU was tasked 
with ‘doing what it does best’:2 creating regulatory and institutional capacity. Hence, this 
study focuses on the decade between the 2001 EU-Egypt Association Agreement (AA) and 
the 2011 Egyptian uprising. 
 
SPS standards in agriculture 
The differentiation of the EU’s approach within a broader international framework, in this 
case represented by WTO regulations, is visible in the case of SPS standards. Following the 
AA, the EU dismantled tariffs on agricultural products at a much faster pace than the 
                                                          
2 Author’s interview with senior economist for the World Bank in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Cairo, June 2010. 
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Egyptian government. This was presented as a sign of the EU’s willingness to give ENP 
partners time to adapt to free trade in agriculture, while providing access to the EU market. 
However, during this first phase Egyptian agricultural exports to the EU market did not 
experience significant growth (Kourtelis, 2015). The explanation for this is twofold. On the 
one hand, the EU kept tariffs on about sixty agricultural items (Colombo and Tocci, 2012). 
On the other hand, safety and quality standards demanded by the EU constituted a major 
hurdle for Egyptian producers. More specifically, within the context of the 1995 WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, EU member states 
agreed on stringent SPS standards, which it then demanded for foreign products entering 
the EU market. As a consequence, most Egyptian producers were unable to export to the EU 
as they failed to obtain the required SPS certifications (Kourtelis, 2015). 
The EU’s ability to promote its own SPS standards, instead of the WTO ones, 
depended not only on being the first outlet for Egypt’s agricultural exports, but also on the 
fragmentation of policy competences in Egypt. On SPS standards, these were shared among 
three ministries: agriculture, trade and industry, and health. As a result, the EU could 
engage in a game of divide-and-rule, which combined with market size enabled it to 
externalize its own SPS standards, rather than promoting the relatively less demanding 
WTO ones.3 As a result of these efforts, for instance, Egypt has adopted the EU’s extremely 
stringent aflatoxin limits (US Department of Agriculture, 2015), which have been shown to 
limit significantly developing countries’ ability to export to the EU (Otsuki et al., 2001).  
Interestingly, in the Egyptian case the EU’s approach to regulation in agriculture 
appears geared towards undermining the scope conditions facilitating its regulatory 
externalization and competitive advantage. On the one hand, the EU has historically been 
                                                          
3 Author’s interviews with official from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Cairo, May 2010, and 
official from the Information and Decision Support Centre, Cairo, April 2010. 
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committed to the establishment of a national food safety authority.4 While the centralization 
of authority might jeopardize the EU’s strategy, it also entails placing food and agricultural 
regulation beyond direct governmental interference. This is consistent with the ordoliberal 
preference for formally delimiting ‘the political’ in order to minimize the possibility of moral 
hazard. On the other hand, the 2007 Action Plan (AP) explicitly aims to ‘reduce substantially 
non tariff barriers of a regulatory and bureaucratic nature to trade and investments’ 
(European Commission, 2007, p. 16). Although stringent SPS requirements are often 
considered a non-tariff barrier in their own right, the EU sees them as key to ‘upgrading the 
quality of Egypt’s agricultural production through improving sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards’ (ibid., p. 4). This reference to ‘upgrading’ implies that higher SPS standards are 
part of the EU’s effort to foster an ordoliberal form of achievement competition. Hence, 
rather than a non-tariff barrier distorting or inhibiting competition, the EU presents this as a 
market-shaping regulation, through which the local sector is expected to reap long-term 
competitiveness gains. The growth of Egypt’s agricultural exports to the EU by an average 
of 4.5 per cent a year between 2009 and 2013 lends some credibility to this argument 
(European Commission, 2014). 
At the same time, the EU’s emphasis on regulatory upgrading along ordoliberal lines 
also serves an instrumental purpose, insofar as it establishes a competitive advantage for 
EU-based companies. In this regard, the EU’s emphasis on the long-term competitiveness 
gains for Egyptian producers conceals the two key benefits of such an arrangement for the 
EU. On the one hand, as the realization of these long-term gains depends on a lengthy and 
costly upgrading of safety and quality requirements, it entails both a temporary protection 
of EU-based producers and a reduction in the number of Egyptian companies able to meet 
                                                          
4 Author’s interviews with three officials from the EU Delegation to Egypt, Cairo, June 2010 and July 
2013. 
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the EU’s safety and quality requirements (Kourtelis, 2015). On the other hand, as the EU’s 
regulatory externalization succeeds, EU-based companies face less competition when 
entering the Egyptian market, as other foreign exporters will be following the WTO’s lower 
SPS standards. Hence, normative commitments to an ordoliberal template dovetail with the 
interests of EU-based agricultural exporters.  
 
Banking sector supervision 
Regulatory reforms in the banking sector also show the EU’s ability to gain autonomy 
within a common template, in this case provided by the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), and more specifically by its Basel II standards. This provides the EU 
with a mandate to build regulatory capacity and upgrade the supervisory framework of the 
Egyptian banking sector in cooperation with the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). 
EU support towards making the Egyptian banking sector Basel II-compliant was 
inserted in a much broader canvas of financial sector reforms, led by the World Bank 
through three Financial Sector Development Policy Loans amounting to $1.5 billion 
disbursed between 2006 and 2010 (World Bank, 2010). These loans accompanied successful 
efforts towards altering substantially the ownership structure of the Egyptian banking 
sector. By the end of 2006, 94 per cent of state-owned shares in banks had been divested 
(World Bank, 2006: 11, ft. 10), while Bank of Alexandria, one of the ‘big four’ public sector 
banks, was privatized in the hands of Intesa-San Paolo (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). 
Within this context, the EU was tasked with supporting the CBE towards developing a 
new supervisory framework ensuring the compliance of the Egyptian banking sector with 
Basel II standards. Towards this end, the EU funded two projects carried out by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) with support from the central banks of seven EU member 
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states.5 The first (MEDA I, 2006-08) focused on capacity-building missions, including the 
establishment of a task force within CBE focusing on Basel II-related issues only. During the 
second project (MEDA II, 2009-12), the task force drafted a new, Basel II compliant, 
supervisory framework (European Central Bank, 2008). The main challenge was identified in 
shifting from compliance-based regulation to risk-based supervision,6 with a change in focus 
from the rules to be followed to the assessment of the risk held by banks. This shift entails 
not simply a technical upgrading of the regulatory framework, but rather commits the CBE 
to accepting and enforcing the parameters of an open global financial order, thus 
contributing to the broader neoliberal agenda pursued through the World Bank-sponsored 
financial reforms. The naturalization of financial sector openness is visible also 
terminologically, in the EU’s preference – accepted by the CBE – for supervision over 
regulation, with the latter understood on both sides as ‘too interventionist’, signalling at the 
very least a convergence of views between ECB and CBE officials.7 This is in line with the 
ordoliberal preference for ‘ordering’ state actions, aiming at creating and fostering a 
competitive market order, over ‘regulatory’ actions, intervening directly on the market 
mechanism (Siems and Schnyder, 2014, pp. 380-1). 
While feeding into the neoliberal trajectory of the Egyptian financial sector, the EU’s 
approach maintained its ordoliberal peculiarities. Similarly to SPS standards, this 
                                                          
5 The central banks selected represented a mix of more and less developed EU member states, some 
using the common currency and some still using a national currency. The members involved were 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Romania. 
6 Author’s interview with ECB resident programme coordinator, Cairo, June 2010. 
7 Author’s interviews with ECB resident programme coordinator and two CBE officials, Cairo, June 
2010. The latter’s comments are somewhat surprising given the well-known state presence and 
intervention in the sector, itself the result of the historical distrust of foreign interests in banking 
(EzzelArab, 2002), and resulting in over-regulation of the sector (Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007). 
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differentiation emerged in the interstices between the general Basel II capital requirements 
and the freedom left to the national regulator, through rather generic ‘national discretions’ 
(Central Bank of Egypt, 2009), regarding the route by which such requirements were met. 
Acting within this space, the EU attempted to shape the CBE’s path towards Basel II 
compliance in two ways. On the one hand, it strongly supported the CBE’s decision to take a 
gradual approach to supervisory upgrading. This meant preparing the Egyptian banking 
sector for the simpler standardized approach to credit risk measurement, reliant on 
evaluations provided by credit rating agencies, over the more complex internal ratings 
models (Central Bank of Egypt, 2011). Thus, gradualism was deemed essential in pursuing 
achievement competition by upgrading the supervisory framework. 
On the other hand, beyond the immediate remit of the MEDA projects, EU and ECB 
officials also applied pressure towards accelerating the CBE’s move towards central bank 
independence.8 Such a move resonates with the typical ordoliberal concern for moral 
hazard, which in central banking takes the form of a clear separation between fiscal and 
monetary authority, with the ensuing depoliticization of the latter.9 Since the 2003 reform, 
the CBE is considered in Egyptian public law as an ‘autonomous’, rather than independent, 
regulatory body.10 The implications of this are visible in the CBE’s statute, explicitly stating 
that it ‘shall also act as the bank of the government’ (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2004, p. 13). 
Hence, in the CBE’s case the primary objective of price stability, at the heart of neoliberal 
                                                          
8 Various author’s interviews with ECB, CBE and EU Delegation officials, Cairo, May-June 2010. 
9 Although the lack of constraints on interest rate setting would not sit well with some ordoliberal 
thinkers such as Eucken (Bibow, 2012). 
10 See on the CBE website: http://www.cbe.org.eg/en/AboutCBE/Pages/Overview.aspx (first 
access: 13 September 2016). 
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and ordoliberal doctrines of sound money, must be combined with its role as sovereign debt 
manager (Ikram, 2006, pp. 192-5). 
Pressures towards central bank independence are yet to yield fruits beyond 
perfunctory promises of taking steps in this direction from the Egyptian side.11 Indeed, the 
well documented rise of businessmen in politics, and more directly in government, in the 
period in which the EU was carrying out these projects,12 suggests that policy capture by a 
small clique was further heightening the risk of moral hazard. Hence, the reach of 
ordoliberal principles in banking supervision was uneven, with re-regulation in accordance 
with Basel II capital requirements successfully completed in 2013, but the CBE still 
hamstrung by its responsibilities over government finances. This is arguably also because, in 
addition to being more politically sensitive, CBE’s genuine independence does not promise 
to yield a pay-off comparable to that obtained by EU-based banks active in Egypt through a 
new supervisory environment closer to their domestic one.  
 
 
 
Telecom 
Although framed within the parameters of the WTO’s Basic Telecom Agreement, in the 
context of telecom regulations the EU’s activities were less constrained than in the other 
sectors examined. On the one hand, this was because already in 2000 the EU was given the 
opportunity to influence the regulatory set-up of a booming and relatively pristine sector, 
                                                          
11 Author’s interviews with ECB resident programme coordinator and with CBE official, Cairo, June 
2010. 
12 The number of businesspeople in parliament rose from 37 in 1995 to 77 in 2000 to 100 in 2005. 
During the second Nazif cabinet (2005-10), no less than six ministries were directly assigned to 
businessmen (Soliman 2011, pp. 145-6). 
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four years after the establishment of the first mobile network. On the other hand, the EU’s 
leverage was increased by low issue politicization, which – given Europe’s leading position 
in telecommunications technologies – created an environment within which the EU could 
rely on its technical knowledge and expertise.13 This relative lack of constraints enabled the 
EU’s regulatory externalization activities to go further than in SPS standards and banking 
supervision, in this case through programmes supporting the telecom regulator NTRA in 
the establishment of an adequate regulatory framework. 
Starting in 2000, the EU engaged with national telecom regulators in ENP South 
countries through the New Approach to Telecommunications Policy (NATP) programme. 
This aimed to assist regulatory authorities in the liberalization and privatization of the 
sector, ‘particularly in the field of the policies, institutes and tools for regulating the 
markets’,14 with the long-term objective of enhancing convergence between the regulatory 
approaches of the EU and partner countries. In the case of Egypt, telecom regulatory 
cooperation is among the AP goals, with the EU ‘providing capacity building in the area of 
competition and regulation’ (European Commission, 2007, p. 33). This seeks to ‘pursue and 
support the development of a comprehensive regulatory framework that would fulfil 
effectively all aspects of its mandate’ and to ‘liberalise the fixed telephony market and 
continue the liberalisation of the mobile telephony market according to national priorities’ 
(ibid). In practice, the programme mostly functioned through twinning exchanges, with 
officials from member states’ telecom regulators spending time at NTRA, and Egyptian 
officials doing the same in member states’ regulatory authorities (Frontier Economics, 2007). 
                                                          
13 Author’s interview with member state’s telecom regulator official participating in the NATP II 
programme, Cairo, June 2010. 
14 See: http://www.euneighbours.eu/en/eu-in-action/projects/natp-ii-telecommunications-policy 
(first access: 7 April 2017).  
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In telecom the EU speaks more directly the language of harmonization, with the 
NTRA supporting this goal, for instance when stating that institutional twinning enhances 
its ‘capacity as telecom regulator through legislative approximation with EU Regulatory 
bodies and through the application of EU best practices that is best suited to the Egyptian 
context’. Taking EU regulators as the benchmark for measuring progress in Egypt was 
justified with reference to the fact that ‘a large number of European countries went through 
similar experiences of having to deal with liberalizing telecom sector dominated by 
monopolies without endangering the social aspects of compromising consumer concerns’.15 
These two quotes illustrate the ordoliberal underpinnings of regulatory harmonization, 
which in this context had three fundamental features. Firstly, reference to EU best practices 
and upward approximation suggests not a move towards deregulation, but rather towards 
regulatory upgrading, once more aiming to foster achievement competition. This might well 
result in a ‘freer markets, more rules’ scenario, paradoxical for Anglo-American neoliberals 
but entirely consistent with an ordoliberal viewpoint (Vogel, 1996). Secondly, and putting 
further distance from Anglo-American neoliberalism, part of the EU’s allure derives from its 
concern for the ‘social aspects’ of regulations, which sets limits to efficiency-seeking 
measures, for instance through consideration of issues such as network coverage, expressed 
in the EU-commissioned country report (Frontier Economics, 2007). Finally, the same 
document demonstrates the EU’s concern for moral hazard and conflicts of interests. These 
were especially egregious in the functioning of NTRA, presided by the minister for 
communications and information technologies, who was at the time also directly involved in 
the state-owned Telecom Egypt, which in turn in 2007 held 49 per cent of the shares of 
Vodafone Egypt, the largest mobile telephony operator (ibid). 
                                                          
15 Both quotes from: http://www.tra.gov.eg/english/DPages_DPagesDetails.asp?ID=144&Menu=7 
(first access 16 January 2015). 
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What was achieved under the NATP programme in terms of implementation mirrors 
the case of banking supervision: ties between regulator and government were not severed, 
and the EU appeared to privilege access to a telecom market with upgraded regulations 
mirroring its own. As put more prosaically by an EU Delegation official then following 
telecom regulatory cooperation, the EU’s goal was ‘to attract as much investment in the 
sector as possible’, suggesting that in the best case scenario NTRA would ‘copy and paste’ 
EU regulation, in order to provide a business environment as close as possible to the one 
EU-based telecom giants faced at home.16 Hence, the promotion of ordoliberal tenets was 
always perceived as functional to pursuing the EU’s perceived interests. The fact that UK-
based Vodafone and France’s Orange are to this day majority shareholders of two of three 
companies operating in the most lucrative telecom segment, mobile telephony, appears to 
suggest that this objective has by and large been achieved. 
 
Ordoliberalism in EU’s external relations: contributions and openings 
The previous section has shown that the EU’s promotion of regulatory reforms in three very 
different sectors of the Egyptian economy is substantially informed by ordoliberal principles 
and practices. This section elaborates on the implications of this finding for two bodies of 
literature studying the EU’s external relations, on normative power Europe (NPE) and 
institutional isomorphism on the one hand, and on EU’s regulatory externalization on the 
other hand. As highlighted throughout, the hypothesis of the EU’s projection of ordoliberal 
regulations in its near abroad finds strong but selective support. For instance, pressures 
towards tackling moral hazard have not led to regulatory independence in banking and 
telecom, while other ordoliberal aims, such as market opening and regulatory upgrading 
geared towards achievement competition, have been achieved. 
                                                          
16 Author’s interview with official of the EU Delegation to Egypt, Cairo, 15 June 2010.  
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If regulatory outcomes in Egypt were only selectively ordoliberal, this is most likely 
determined by some combination of two factors. Partly, this depends on what the 
counterpart deems feasible in the face of domestic, regional and global pressures. In other 
words, even when dealing with countries with weaker regulatory capacity and less power 
resources, the EU encounters significant constraints. This is even more the case with a large 
partner country possessing significant leverage such as Egypt. However, the selectivity also 
partly depends on what the EU decides to prioritize in its reform promotion activities. 
Across the three sectors considered, the constant is the priority accorded to the perceived 
interests of EU-based companies. While this is consistent with interest-based accounts, what 
these insufficiently explain is the broader ordoliberal framing of regulatory reforms, which 
is not necessarily in the interest of EU-based companies, arguably more interested in market 
access per se than moral hazard and achievement competition. Hence, both the power and 
the limitations of ordoliberalism in shaping the EU’s regulatory reform promotion in Egypt 
show the need to move beyond the NPE tendency to put material interests and ideas in a 
binary opposition. In this regard, this paper sides with emerging literature, coming from 
both ideational/discursive (Del Sarto, 2015; Diez, 2013) and rationalist (Damro, 2012, 2015; 
Young, 2015) quarters, arguing for the need to overcome this opposition and craft ways 
through which the interaction of norms and interests can be fruitfully analyzed.  
As the selectivity in the outcomes of the ordoliberal re-regulatory drive also depends 
on perceived material interests, we can re-assess the core claim of institutional isomorphism. 
In her influential article, Bicchi (2006, p. 287) maintains that the EU not only promotes its 
own model in the Southern Mediterranean, a claim validated by the findings of this paper, 
but also that this tendency is fundamentally ‘unreflexive […] because institutions tend to 
export institutional isomorphism as a default option’. In light of the evidence discussed 
above, this argument does not appear to hold for regulatory reforms. Rather, the 
abandonment of some ordoliberal tenets, as well as the consistent pursuit of others, shows a 
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degree of instrumentality in how the EU engages in regulatory externalization in Egypt. This 
is visible for instance in the presentation of re-regulation as upgrading, in turn often 
conflated with harmonization and/or convergence on EU terms. This instrumentality can 
also be seen in how the economic agenda is consciously articulated with security and 
stability concerns (Herranz-Surrallés, 2017; Author, 2017). 
This instrumentality is not lost on the literature on the EU as a global regulator and 
more generally on regulatory externalization. Here, however, a residual binary approach 
persists in the tendency to see the main regulatory actors as either competing or cooperating 
(Newman and Posner, 2015; Young, 2015). The focus of this paper on the ordoliberal content 
of EU-promoted regulatory reforms permits to insert them in a broader context, that of the 
neoliberal economic restructuring that has shaped, albeit unevenly, the global economy over 
the past four decades. While the literature on the EU’s regulatory externalization does 
consider contextual factors, these are often reduced to issues such as the distribution of 
regulatory capacity and institutional density at the global level (Newman and Posner, 2015, 
pp. 1321-4). Taking into adequate consideration the material and ideational underpinnings 
of the content of the EU’s regulatory externalization activities enables research to overcome 
a dichotomous view of competition and cooperation, and hence to address more complex 
dynamics of competition within a broadly cooperative framework, such as the ones 
presented here, as well as instances of contingent regulatory cooperation within generally 
competitive relations. Within the context of this study, for instance, this approach shows the 
extent to which the EU’s regulatory externalization, while aiming to maximize benefits for 
EU-based companies, also contributes to the broader process of opening supported both by 
IEOs and by the EU’s main competitors seeking access to the Egyptian economy. 
In contributing to these bodies of literature, the approach proposed here not only 
highlights some of their limitations, but also promises to provide a terrain for fruitful 
engagement among them. On the one hand, the open-ended struggle over the weight and 
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limits of ordoliberal principles and practices in EU’s external economic policies permits the 
exploration of the social construction of the EU’s economic interests, for which ideational 
and constructivist approaches are ideally suited. This might entail an examination of how 
specific ideas become ‘weapons’ (Blyth, 2003, pp. 39-40), as well as how their promotion 
shapes, and is shaped by, specific perceptions of the interests at stake. On the other hand, 
insofar as it accepts and acknowledges the centrality of power, and the struggle for it 
through both cooperative and competitive strategies, the focus on context beyond 
distribution of regulatory capacity and institutional density might also enable the literature 
on the EU as a global regulator to broaden and further its research agenda.  
 
Conclusion  
During the 2000s, the EU has become an important contributor to the economic restructuring 
along neoliberal lines already occurring in Egypt. Inserted within this broader process, the 
EU’s approach to regulatory reforms was differentiated not as much in its gradualism, 
shared with other IEOs in the case of Egypt, but rather in its emphasis on re-regulation 
following ordoliberal principles. Some of these principles, usually more directly resonant 
with the perceived interests of EU-based companies, were achieved, while others – for 
instance concerning moral hazard – were not. This finding emerging from the study of the 
EU-promoted reforms concerning SPS standards in agriculture, banking supervision and 
telecom regulation is but a first attempt to address the empirical gap regarding the EU’s 
regulatory reform promotion in its near abroad beyond aid and trade. 
This finding also has important theoretical implications for the literature on the EU’s 
external relations. Firstly, it takes discussions on ordoliberalism, so far confined to the EU’s 
internal economic governance model, into the study of the EU’s external relations. An 
exploration of the extent to which ordoliberal principles and practices inform the EU’s 
regulatory reform promotion activities in its near abroad and in external relations broadly, 
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in turn, complements two influential bodies of literature. On the one hand, it retrieves the 
strategic instrumentality with which ordoliberal principles are pursued, underestimated in 
the literature on the role of institutional isomorphism in the EU’s relations with 
neighbouring countries. On the other hand, through its emphasis on the theoretical and 
philosophical underpinnings of regulatory policies, it highlights a dimension insufficiently 
studied by the literature on the EU’s regulatory externalization. Finally, insofar as it recovers 
both the material/instrumental and the ideational/normative preconditions of the EU’s 
regulatory reform promotion activities, this paper also contributes to the quest for an 
approach to EU’s external relations that moves beyond the ontological reductionism of NPE 
towards an appreciation of the interplay of material and ideational factors, as well as of 
content and context. The latter appears to have changed dramatically in recent years. This is 
visible within the EU, with the increased weight of ordoliberalism attested by the 
management of the Eurozone crisis, but also in its neighbourhood with war, crisis and 
instability, most notably in Syria and Ukraine, as well as in Egypt with the 2011 uprisings 
and the ensuing counterrevolution. Future research might want to explore to what extent 
this change in context has affected the content of the EU’s external economic relations in the 
era of the ‘principled pragmatism’ hailed by the EU’s Global Strategy (2016, p. 8).  
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